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We assess the fiscal-growth nexus with a large country panel, accounting for the usually 
encountered econometric pitfalls. Our results show that revenues have no significant impact on 
growth whereas expenditures have negative effects. The same is true for the OECD with the 
addition that government revenue has a negative impact on growth. Taxes on income are usually 
detrimental to growth, as well as public wages, interest payments, subsidies and government 
consumption have a negative effect on growth. Social spending is detrimental to growth; spending 
on education and health boosts growth; and there is weak evidence supporting causality running 
from expenditures and revenues to output and TFP.  
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“…history makes clear that countries that continually spend beyond their means 
suffer slower growth in incomes and living standards and are prone to greater 
economic and financial instability. Conversely, good fiscal management is a 
cornerstone of sustainable growth and prosperity.” Ben Bernanke, Annual 




According to conventional wisdom, in most countries (particularly developing ones), larger 
budget deficits have coincided in the past with less efficient government spending, large 
bureaucracies, and other counterproductive economic policies. Hence, among the factors that 
determine economic growth, government spending and fiscal policies in general are of particular 
interest. Such fiscal-growth nexus is particularly important in situations of economic downturns, 
where tax revenues tend to flee rather quickly and the spending side of the budget adjusts slowly, 
notably in view of the effect of automatic stabilisers and of possible counter-cyclical discretionary 
fiscal policies, which implies the building up of larger budget deficits and possible increased fiscal 
sustainability problems. 
Although large fiscal imbalances can impose an unwarranted burden on the economy, not all 
government spending is created equal. Therefore, and in order to inform notably policy decision 
making, the effects on economic activity of several spending and revenue budgetary components 
need to be assessed, which is the main objective of this paper. 
The empirical analysis of the impact of government expenditure on long-run growth include 
the early works by Feder (1983), Landau (1983), Ram (1986), Grier and Tullock (1989), Romer 
(1990), Barro (1990), Derajavan et al. (1996) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). Such studies used cross-
section data to link measures of government spending with economic growth rates. 
However, traditional OLS regression analysis is not sufficient to determine the direction of 
causality. When economic growth is regressed on government spending, researchers tend to 
interpret this as an eventual confirmation of causality from the latter to the former. Nevertheless, a 
significant coefficient can be equally compatible with the Keynesian view (causality from 
government expenditure to growth), Wagner’s Law (from growth to spending) and/or a bi-
directional causality between the two variables. 
We use cross-sectional/time series data for a large panel of developed and developing countries 
for the period 1970-2008. In the empirical estimations of growth specifications we address several 
of the econometric caveats that usually plague such analyses: outliers, simultaneity, endogeneity, 
cross-sectional dependence, causality, nonlinearities and threshold effects. Specifically, we 
examine the following issues: the influence of which budgetary components have a stronger 
influence in affecting (positively or negatively) per capita GDP and Total Factor Productivity 
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(TFP) growth rates; the change in coefficient signs (and magnitudes) with different government 
debt and budget deficit ratios thresholds; differences in these relationships between country groups 
and robustness to different econometric specifications; the direction of causality; is there evidence 
in favour of Keynesian (or non-Keynesian) effects or supporting the existence of Wagner’s Law? 
Therefore, the contributions of our paper include: i) the assessment of the fiscal-growth nexus 
with a diversified variety of methods, providing sensitivity and robustness and dealing notably 
with model uncertainty; ii) the study of the relevance of economic and functional government 
expenditure categories and of revenue sub-components; iii) panel Granger causality tests, and the 
assessment of the existence of cross-sectional dependence within homogeneous groups of 
countries.  
In a nutshell, our results comprise notably: 
i) for the full sample revenues have no significant impact on growth whereas government 
expenditures have significant negative effects; ii) the same is true for the OECD sub-sample with 
the addition that total government revenues have a negative impact on growth; iii) taxes on income 
are usually detrimental to growth; iv) public wages, interest payments, subsidies and government 
consumption have a negative effect on output growth; v) expenditures on social security and 
welfare are detrimental to growth; vi) both government spending on education and health boosts 
growth; vii) there is weak evidence supporting causality running for expenditures or revenues to 
GDP per capita (and TFP); viii) there is evidence supporting Wagner’s Law. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two surveys the literature. Section three describes 
the analytical and econometric methodology. Section four presents the data and discusses our main 
results. Section five summarises the paper’s main findings. 
 
2. Literature 
The nexus between fiscal policy and growth has been a subject of several previous studies (see 
Zagler and Durnecker, 2003, for a survey). Likewise, Gemmell (2004) has summarised several 
empirical work and explains that it is important to distinguish between productive and non-
productive expenditure, and that results depend on whether the simultaneous effects of different 
revenue and expenditure categories as well as deficit decisions have been taken into account.  
Some pioneer theoretical contributions, underlying our empirical analysis, are notably 
Modigliani (1961) and Diamond (1965). For instance, with an endogenous growth model, Cashin 
(1994) reports that increased government spending on productive items generate positive 
externalities, raising private investment and economic growth. Nevertheless, Slemrod et al. (1995) 
did not find conclusive correlations between taxes and the level of per capita income in their 
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theoretical model. This supports the inconclusive results found across the literature and the 
debatable nature of the objective impact of fiscal policy on economic growth. 
Empirical studies using the economic decomposition of budgetary items usually find evidence 
of a negative relationship between government expenditures and growth, such as Barro’s (1997) 
seminal contribution in which he found a significantly negative effect on growth from the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) take 100 countries from 1970 to 
1988 and find that i) there is a strong association between the development level and the fiscal 
structure in poor countries relying heavily on international trade taxes, while income taxes are only 
important in advanced countries; ii) while the effects of taxation are difficult to isolate empirically. 
Lee (1995) found that government consumption was associated with slower growth for a 
sample of 89 developed and developing countries for the period 1960-1985. With opposing results, 
Slemrod et al. (1995) report a positive correlation between government expenditure to GDP ratio 
and the level of real GDP per capita across countries and no relationship for OECD countries 
alone. Engen and Skinner (1992) mention that a balanced-budget increase in government spending 
reduces output growth in a sample of 107 countries from 1970 to 1985. Landau (1983) and Grier 
and Tullock (1989) analyse a sample of 104 and 115 countries, respectively, and find that the 
growth of government consumption is negatively correlated with growth, including the OECD.  
For 28 OECD countries Afonso and Furceri (2010) report that social contributions, government 
consumption and subsidies have a sizeable negative and statistically significant effect on growth. 
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) conclude for the EU15 countries that the expenditure side of the 
budget appears to affect long-run growth over the business cycle. Fölster and Henrekson (1999) 
report a tendency towards a negative growth effect of large public expenditures, which is robust 
across different econometric specifications. Conte and Darrat (1988) study OECD countries 
between 1960 and 1984 and argue that government growth has had mixed effects on growth.  
Hakro (2009) finds a positive relationship between government expenditure and GDP per 
capita growth for 21 Asian countries, while Bairam (1990) using a sample of 20 African countries 
from 1960 to 1985, finds that the effects of government expenditure cannot be generalized. 
It is interesting to notice that when it comes to public investment one would expect it to boost 
growth. However, in Afonso and Furceri (2010) government investment has a sizeable negative 
and statistically significant effect on growth. Devarajan et al. (1996) found that for a sample of 43 
developing countries increases in the share of public investment expenditure (including 
transportation and communication) have significant negative effects on growth. Prichett (1996) 
suggests the so-called “white-elephant” hypothesis in which public investment in developing 
countries is often used for unproductive projects. Nelson and Singh (1994) looking at 70 
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developing countries  for two distinct time periods (1970-79; 1980-89) and uncover mixed effects 
of public investment on growth. 
One the one hand, higher public investment raises the national rate of capital accumulation 
above the level chosen (in a presumed rational fashion) by private sector agents. Therefore, public 
capital spending may crowd out private expenditures on capital goods on an ex-ante basis as 
individuals seek to re-establish an optimal inter-temporal allocation of resources. On the other 
hand, public capital – particularly infrastructure capital as highways, water systems, sewers and 
airports – is likely to bear a complementary relationship with private capital in the private 
production technology. Thus, higher public investment may raise the marginal productivity of 
private capital and thereby crowd-in private investment (see Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2009).  
Slemrod et al. (1995) found a positive correlation between the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio and 
the level of real GDP per capita across countries, particularly when developing countries were 
included in the sample. Plosser (1992) found a significant negative correlation between the level of 
taxes on income and profits (as a share of GDP) and growth of real per capita GDP. Koester and 
Kormendi (1989) in a cross-country analysis of 63 countries in the 1970s suggest that apparent 
negative effects of taxes on growth disappear upon controlling for potential endogeneity and the 
relation between growth and income per capita. 
Regarding the functional decomposition of spending, Afonso and Alegre (2011), for a Euro-
area panel between 1970 and 2006, find a significant dependence of productivity on public 
expenditure on education, as well as a relevant role of social security and health for economic 
growth and the labour market. Folster and Henrekson (2001) report a robust negative relationship 
between social expenditures and economic growth. Baum and Lin (1993) taking a heterogeneous 
sample of 47 countries find that the growth rate of educational expenditures has a significant 
positive impact on growth. The growth rate of welfare expenditures has a negative and 
insignificant impact on growth. Differently, Landau (1986) reports that government educational 
expenditure has noticeably reduced economic growth.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Analytical framework 
In the context of a neoclassical growth model the underlying basic aggregate production 
function can be written as Y=F(L,K), with Y being the real aggregated output; L the labour force or 
population; and K capital (physical and human).  
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Nevertheless, the standard growth model is based on a conditional convergence equation that 
relates real growth of per capita GDP to the initial level of income per capita,1 investment-to-GDP 
ratio (a proxy for physical capital), a measure of human capital or educational attainment and the 
population growth rate, augmented with government expenditures and revenues components.2 As a 
result, the aggregate production function is Y=F(L,K,G) being G the relevant fiscal variable. 
Therefore the empirical specification to assess the linkages between fiscal policy and growth can 
be written as follows: 
 itititit
j
ioititit Gxyyy ενηγββα ++++++=− − 101  (1)  
where i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, t (t=1,…,T) indicates the period, 1−− itit yy represents the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita; 0iy is the initial value of real GDP per capita;
3 itjx  j=1,2 is a 
vector of control variables ( itx1  comprises of population growth, investment, education and trade 
openness; itx 2  includes itx1  – apart from trade openness – and adds labour force participation and 
the unemployment rate);4 itG  is a fiscal policy-related variable, either total government revenues 
or expenditures (or their respective sub-components5); iν , tη correspond to the country-specific 
fixed effect and time-fixed effect, respectively. Finally, itε  is a column vector of some unobserved 
zero mean white noise-type satisfying the standard assumptions. 0 1, ,α β β  and γ are unknown 
parameters to be estimated. In addition, and in order to assess an eventual non-linear relationship, 
a squared term can also be included for the relevant fiscal variable  
 
3.2. Econometric approaches 
Model Selection 
Several studies in the growth literature have found a negative bivariate relationship between 
growth and a measure of government size (e.g., Plosser, 1993). In addition, it is well known that 
the inclusion of particular control variables in a growth regression can wipe out (or change the 
signs of) this relationship (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Therefore, the motivation for the use of 
techniques dealing with uncertainty rests on the concern over the robustness of the candidate 
_____________________________ 
1 The initial level of income per capita is a robust and significant variable for growth (in terms of conditional or beta 
convergence). 
2 Based on the theoretical underpinnings from, e.g., Landau (1983) or Ram (1986). 
3 For regressions using annual data, the lagged value of GDP( 1−ity ) is used instead. 
4 For more details refer to Section 4.1 (“Data and Descriptive Statistics”). 
5 On the revenue side we have (all in % GDP): tax revenues, domestic taxes on goods and services, taxes on income, 
profits and capital gains, taxes on property, taxes on payroll or work force, and social security contributions. On the 
expenditure side we have (all in % GDP): compensation of employees, interest payments, subsidies, public final 
consumption expenditure as well as a functional decomposition comprising of public spending on education, health, 
and social security and welfare. 
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variables in any cross-section regression used to explain different success patterns in real income 
growth.  
With these constraints in mind, we follow Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds analysis (EBA). 
Adapted to our context, this implies the estimation of regressions of the form 
 ε++++= jxjzjyjj xbzbybaY , (2)  
where y is a vector of fixed variables that always appear in the regressions (initial level of income 
per capita, investment-to-GDP ratio, population growth and a measure of educational attainment), 
z denotes the variable of interest (different components of government expenditure and revenue) 
and jx is a vector of three variables taken from the pool of X additional plausible control variables. 
The regression model has to be estimated for the M possible combinations of Xx j ∈ .
6 As many 
controls are captured by the country dummies we restrict the following ten variables in vector X 
(see the Appendix): dependency ratio, fertility, trade openness, labour force, urban population, 
unemployment, democracy index, Freedom House composite index, population density and a 
measure of financial depth (liquid liabilities over GDP). Therefore, ten conditioning variables 
imply 1203
10 =C  possible combinations of Xx j ∈ . 
We also employ the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach. Essentially BMA treats 
parameters and models as random variables and attempts to summarise the uncertainty about the 
model in terms of a probability distribution over the space of possible models. The method is used 
to average the posterior distribution for the parameters under all possible models, where the 
weights are the posterior model probabilities7 (as discussed in more detail in Raftery (1995) and 
more recently applied by Malik and Temple (2009)). In the empirical section, the output of the 
BMA analysis includes the posterior inclusion probabilities for variables and a sign certainty 
index.8 The higher the posterior probability for a particular variable the more robust that 
determinant for real GDP growth appears to be.  
 
Panel Techniques 
Cross-country regressions are usually based, in this context, on average values of fiscal 
variables and growth over long time periods. For instance, for long time spans, the level of 
government spending is likely to be influenced by demographics, particularly by an increasing 
_____________________________ 
6 For each model j one estimates 
zjb  and the corresponding standard deviation zjσ . The lower extreme bound is defined 
as the lowest value of 
zjzjb σ2−  and the upper extreme bound is defined to be the largest value of zjzjb σ2+ . If the lower 
extreme bound is negative and the upper extreme bound is positive, the variable is considered not to be robust. 
7 To evaluate the posterior model probability the BMA uses the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). 
8 For posterior inclusion, probabilities greater than 0.50, a sign certainty index is presented, clearly suggesting the 
relationship being either positive or negative. 
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share of elderly people. Therefore, a simultaneity issue arises. Moreover, problems such as 
endogeneity, both in terms of government spending and tax policies, and inefficiency, due to the 
discarding of information on within-country variation, can come up.  
Resorting to panel data can overcome (some of) these problems, and has other advantages. 
Specifically, we focus mainly on combined cross-section time-series regressions using cumulative 
5-year non-overlapping averages to smooth the effects of short-run fluctuations, even though 
initial growth regressions will be first estimated with annual data. We run within fixed-effects as a 
benchmark model despite being aware of the econometric IV-related problems associated with this 
method in the context of fiscal policy and growth. Given that technological change occurs over 
time, a time index is a logical way to control for the effect of technological progress on the 
evolution of per capita GDP growth. However, the effect of technological change on output 
growth would likely not be well captured by a simple time trend that assumes a constant effect 
over time. Indeed, a Lowess smoothing of per capita GDP against government expenditure and 
revenue suggests that there are some non-linear relationships (not shown). Therefore, non-linear 
effects of technological change on output growth are allowed for by using individual year indicator 
dummies in most estimated panel models.9 
Finally, another contribution in our study is the use of two robust estimators, the Method of 
Moments (MM)10 and the Least Absolute Deviation (LAD)11 to deal with outliers.  
  
Bias and endogeneity  
One needs to address the potential endogeneity problem of right-hand side regressors and 
while country-specific fixed effects might capture some of the omitted variables (if we miss out an 
important variable it not only means our model is poorly specified it also means that any estimated 
parameters are likely to be biased),12 it does not solve the problem and we may get may get biased 
_____________________________ 
9 Since the empirical model assumes that production technology is homogeneous across countries there is nothing 
inherently inconsistent with the assumption that TFP growth is the same across countries. The period covered by the 
data includes a number of characteristic slumps (e.g. the two oil crises in the 1970s), but nevertheless one is able to 
identify a generally upward movement of TFP, particularly in the 1990s. 
10 This estimator fits the efficient high breakdown estimator proposed by Yokai (1987), which on the first stage takes 
the S estimator applied to the residual scale and derives starting values for the coefficient vectors, and on the second 
stage applies the Huber-type bisquare M-estimator using iteratively re-weighted least squares (IRWLS) to obtain the 
final coefficient estimates. 
11 It minimises the sum of squares over half the observations. The estimator seeks out part of the data for which the 
model has greatest explanatory power and then bases the parameter estimates on just that portion of the data. We then 
exclude any observations for which the LAD residual is more than two standard deviations from the mean residual, 
before re-estimating the model by OLS or FE. 
12 If the variables are uncorrelated with the omitted variables, then our results may be unbiased. Thus, by not using 
predictors that might be correlated with a possible important omitted variable, we may reduce the bias. Therefore, if 
we put a predictor that is correlated with an omitted variable into our model, we generate endogeneity bias. On the 
other hand, the more variables that we have in our model, the less likely it is that we are omitting something. 
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coefficient estimates. Therefore, we also use the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable 
(LSDV-C) estimator by Bruno (2005).  
Moreover, we use a panel Instrumental Variable-Generalised Least Squares (IV-GLS) 
approach, which is then complemented by estimating the main equations using Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM). The first-differenced GMM estimate can be poorly behaved if the 
time series are persistent. This problem can get very serious in practice and authors like Bond, 
Hoeffler and Temple (2001) suggest the use of a more efficient GMM estimator, the system 
estimator, to exploit stationarity restrictions.13 
Hence, we estimate the growth specifications by system-GMM (SYS-GMM) which jointly 
estimates the equations in first differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the dependent and 
independent variables, and in levels, using as instruments the first differences of the regressors. 
Regarding the information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) used as instruments in the 
difference (level) equation, as work by Roodman (2009) has indicated, when it comes to moment 
conditions more is not always better.14 
 
Panel Granger causality 
We also perform a panel version of a Granger-causality test between per capita GDP (and TFP) 
and fiscal variables, similarly to Huang and Temple (2005).15 Our TFP variable is a newly 
computed measure based on growth accounting techniques according to the methodology 
described in Afonso and Jalles (2011). 
Since causality can run in either direction, one cannot take government expenditures and 
government revenues as strictly exogenous. Alternatively, we run partial adjustment specifications 
which allow feedback by means of sequential moment conditions to identify the model (see 
Arellano, 2003). The standard approach in the literature would be to specify an AR(1) model as 
follows: 
 1 1 1 1it it it i t ity y x vα β η φ− −= + + + + , (3)  
with i=1,2,…N; t=1,2,…,T , and where in our case ity  is real per capita GDP (or TFP) and itx  will 
be independent government expenditures and revenues (deflated and in per capita terms). The 
_____________________________ 
13 Although stationarity of averages of investment and population growth rates are quite consistent with the Solow 
growth model, constant means of the per capita GDP series are clearly not. Fortunately, also here, the inclusion of the 
time dummies solves the problem without violating the validity of the additional moment restrictions used by the 
system GMM estimator. In the type of convergence regressions to be analysed, the succession of time dummies can be 
interpreted as the evolution of common TFP over time. 
14 The GMM estimators are likely to suffer from “overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or 
exceeds) the number of groups/countries. In the present case, the choice of lags was directed by checking the validity 
of different sets of instruments and we rely on comparisons of first stage R-squares. 
15 They applied the same technique to study the trade-finance relationship in a panel of heterogeneous countries. 
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reverse relationship is also explored to test notably the hypothesis of the Wagner’s Law holding 
for the full sample and OECD sub-sample. 
The model in (3) allows for unobserved heterogeneity through the individual effect iη  that 
captures the joint effect of time-invariant omitted variables. tφ  is a common time effect, while itv  
is the disturbance term. We also assume that itx  is potentially correlated with iη and may be 
correlated with itv , but is uncorrelated with future shocks ,..., 21 ++ itit vv  The model can be estimated 
by difference-GMM (DIF-GMM), which makes use of all available lagged levels of ity  and itx  
dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments. We use Hansen J's test to assess the model specification and 
overidentifying restrictions. As there are a number of limitations of DIF-GMM estimation16, the 
system-GMM estimator can be used to alleviate the weak instruments problem. In our setting, the 
SYS-GMM uses the standard moment conditions, while SYS-GMM1 (modified 1) only uses the 
lagged first-differences of ity  dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels and SYS-GMM2 
(modified 2) only uses lagged first-differences of itx  dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in 
levels. 
    In the AR(1) model, one hypothesis of economic interest is the null 01 =β  – this can be 
interpreted as a panel data test for Granger causality. Instead of a Wald-type test, we use an 
alternative methodology: we estimate both the unrestricted and the restricted models using the 
same moment conditions, and then compare their (two-step) Hansen J statistics using an 
incremental Hansen test defined as: 
 ))()~(( γγ )JJnDRU −=  (4)  
where )~(γJ is the minimized GMM criterion for the restricted model, )(γ)J  for the unrestricted 
model, and n is the number of observations.17 
    There are some additional issues of interpretation worth discussing in the context of the use of 
the above model. One may be interested in the stability of the estimated model. If our model is 
stable, we can compute a point estimate for the long-run effect18 of itx  on ity : 
 )1/( 11 αββ −=LR , (5)  
_____________________________ 
16 For instance, the lagged levels of the series may be weak instruments for first differences, especially when they  are 
highly persistent, or the variance of the individual effects is high relative to the variance of the transient shocks. 
17 Under the null, RUD  is asymptotically distributed as 
2
rχ where r is the number of restrictions. The intuition is that, 
if the parameter restriction ( 01 =β ) is valid, the moment conditions should keep their validity even in the restricted 
model. For more details see Bond and Windmeijer (2005). 
18 An approximate standard error for this long-run effect is estimated using the Delta Method. 
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Lastly, we can test for unobserved heterogeneity. In the absence of individual effects, the 
following additional moment conditions become valid, corresponding to the use of lagged-levels 



















. (6)  
The validity of these additional set of moment conditions (that can be tested using an 
incremental Hansen test relative to difference or system GMM), can be evaluated with a test for 
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (where the null is no heterogeneity).19  
 
Cross-sectional dependence 
We are aware of the potential issue (in particular, bias in coefficient estimates) induced by a 
significant cross-sectional dependence (within similar groups of countries in our sample) in the 
error term of the model. As put forward by Eberhardt et al. (2010), the so-called unobserved 
common factor technique relies on both latent factors in the error term and regressors to take into 
account the existence of cross-sectional dependence. Developed with the panel-data/time-series 
econometric literature over the course of the past few years, this method has been largely 
employed in macroeconomic panel data exercises (see, e.g., Coakley et al. (2006), Pesaran and 
Tosetti (2007), Bai (2009), Kapetanios et al. (2009), Afonso and Rault (2010) and Eberhardt and 
Teal (2011 and references therein)). This common factor methodology takes cross-sectional 
dependence as the outcome of unobserved time-varying omitted common variables or shocks 
which influence each cross-sectional element in a different way. Cross-sectional dependence in the 
error term of the estimated model results then in inconsistent coefficient estimates if independent 
variables are correlated with the unspecified common variables or shocks. 
With this in mind, we test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence Pesaran’s (2004) CD 
test statistic based on a standard normal distribution. We then run some of the most important 
regression equations with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. This non-parametric 
technique assumes the error structure to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag and 
possibly correlated between the groups. Given the particular nature of the dependent variable and 
the possibility of error dependence another estimation approach would be worthwhile. We rely on 
the Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects pooled (CCEP) estimator, a generalization of the 
fixed effects estimator that allows for the possibility of cross section correlation. Including the 
(weighted) cross sectional averages of the dependent variable and individual specific regressors is 
_____________________________ 
19 The motivation for using this test is that, if individual effects are absent, the pooled OLS will be a consistent 
estimator, despite not fully efficient given the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
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suggested by Pesaran (2009) as an effective way to filter out the impacts of common factors, 
which could be common technological shocks or macroeconomic shocks, causing between group 
error dependence. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data and descriptive analysis 
The dataset was collected from several sources (see Appendix for definitions, acronyms and 
sources). Our main dependent variables are: real GDP per capita retrieved from the World Bank’s 
Word Development Indicators (WDI); and TFP whose construction is described in Afonso and 
Jalles (2011). 
Fiscal variables come from the WDI, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and 
Easterly’s (2001) data. They comprise the Budget Balance (% GDP) and the Central Government 
Debt (% GDP) – the latter retrieved from the IMF’s historical debt database due to Abas et al. 
(2010). On the government revenue side we have, as % of GDP: Total Government Revenue, Tax 
Revenue, Taxes on Goods and Services, Taxes on Payroll or work force, Taxes on Income, Profits 
and Capital Gains, Taxes on Property, and Social Contributions. On the government expenditure 
side we consider, as a % of GDP: Total Government Expenditure, Compensation of Employees, 
Interest Payments, Subsidies, Public Final Consumption Expenditure, and a functional 
decomposition comprising of Spending on Education, Spending on Health, and Spending on 
Social Security and Welfare. 
With respect to human capital proxies we mainly rely on the average years of schooling for the 
population over 25 years old from the international data on educational attainment by Barro and 
Lee (2010), but we also take the literacy rate (% of people ages 15 to 24), primary school 
enrolment (% gross), primary school duration (years), secondary school enrolment (% gross), 
secondary school duration (years), tertiary school enrolment (% gross) and tertiary school duration 
(years) from the WDI, for robustness purposes. 
As for other controls and regressors, most come from either the WDI or from the IMF’s IFS, as 
follows: land area (in square kilometres), population, real interest rate (%), interest rate spread 
(lending rate minus deposit rate), imports and exports of goods and services (BoP, current USD), 
labour participation rate (% of total labour force), labour force, unemployment, (% of total labour 
force), fertility rate (births per woman), urban population (% of total), short-term debt (% of 
exports of goods and services), terms of trade adjustment (constant LCU), real effective exchange 
rate index (2000=100). 
It is also interesting to see how government expenditure and revenue ratios evolved over time. 
For this purpose we plot the Kernel density estimates (Figure 1). We see that government spending 
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and revenue have increased throughout time, which implies an increase of the size of the 
government notably when trying to provide the additional services related to the welfare state. This 
result is particularly clear for the case of government spending, in all country sub-groups.  
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
4.2. Model selection 
In Table 1 we report our results from the EBA analysis (which controls for collinearity) for the 
full sample. The evidence suggests that both total government revenues and expenditures have a 
significantly negative impact on output growth (both the upper and lower bounds report the same 
sign) and this is in line with Folster and Henrekson (2001) and Afonso and Furceri (2010). 
Moreover, the most negative effect (in terms of coefficient magnitude) comes from taxes on 
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payroll or workforce. Taxes on property, however, seem to boost growth. Turning to expenditures, 
public investment has a significantly negative effect on output growth, whereas government 
spending on wages of the public sector’s employees and consumption appear to be detrimental to 
per capita GDP. We are aware that one of the strongest objections to EBA is that the models 
generating the bounds might be flawed (e.g., an important variable may be omitted). Hence, the 
results of an EBA should be carefully analysed. 
[Table 1] 
One reason for the strong appeal of the BMA is that the weights in the final averaging 
procedure are tied quite closely to the predictive ability of the different models. Vis-à-vis the EBA, 
in the BMA there is no set of fixed variables included and the number of explanatory variables in 
the specifications is flexible. In Table 2 we have the results from our BMA application where the 
dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. We present 10 different possible models 
containing different sets of regressors grouped by type: scale/size, living conditions, 
policy/institutional, education and, finally, government. 
A robust result is that the initial level of per capita GDP should be included and it has the 
expected negative (and significant) sign, translating the conditional beta-type convergence 
hypothesis. Moreover, size, proxied either by population, land area or labour force, is detrimental 
to growth. Other interesting results are the fact that both mortality and fertility rates (proxying 
living conditions and state of development) have a negative effect on growth. Policy variables such 
as openness to international trade have a positive impact on growth, and the same is true with 
institutional measures such as the Freedom House index and the Polity democracy index. 
Furthermore, we confirm the (positive) impact of human capital, traditionally included in both 
theoretical neoclassical and endogenous growth models and seminal empirical studies. With 
respect to government-related variables the main findings are: i) inconclusive results for the effects 
of government revenues attested by mixed evidence from models 5 and 10, and a negative impact 
of government outlays. Evidence seems to suggest that both the debt-to-GDP ratio and debt 
average term to maturity negatively affect growth.  
[Table 2] 
We then take a similar approach and set of regressors to study their impact on TFP growth and 
on the stock of capital per worker growth (see Afonso and Jalles, 2011). Some results worth 
highlighting are the following. We observe that education matters positively to TFP growth as well 
as government revenues and expenditures, while debt has a detrimental effect. The same applies to 
the growth rate of the capital stock per worker.  
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Finally, in Table 3 for each dependent variable previously discussed we report the top models 
based on their R-squares. All in all, the best models include expenditure components and signal 
the relatively less important impact/effect attributed to government revenues’ categories. 
[Table 3] 
 
4.3. Fiscal-growth relationship 
According notably to Gupta et al. (2005) the composition of public outlays has a bearing on 
the nexus between budget deficits and growth. Table 4 summarizes the results of a series of panel 
regressions of per capita GDP growth on four variables: total government expenditures (% GDP), 
total government revenues (% GDP) and their growth rates, using 5-year averages. When 
expenditure is included alone in the equation, the correlation between government size and growth 
is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. Government revenue appears with a negative, 
though insignificant, coefficient when included alone (specification 3). However, initial 
government revenues are strongly correlated with initial income per capita (specification 11), a 
variable which is itself negatively correlated with growth (specification 1). Hence, total 
government revenue could be capturing part of the effect of initial income when we omit this 
variable from the equation. Even after controlling for initial income, the coefficient of total 
government revenue remains negative and insignificant. The expansion of government revenues, 
rather than its absolute size, seems to boost growth (specifications 5 and 9). If instead of fixed-
effects we accounted for endogeneity problems and ran an IV-GLS regression results don’t 
change.  
[Table 4] 
Results for the OECD sub-sample (available from the authors) show that both expenditures 
and revenues appear with statistically significant negative coefficients in almost all regressions. 
Moreover, and even if both variables are strongly correlated with initial income per capita, after 
controlling for initial income, we still get the same result. The coefficients of total government 
revenue and expenditure are negative and significant. Contrary to the full sample case, government 
revenue growth is detrimental to economic growth. The same is true for spending growth 
(previously insignificant for the full sample).20 
Taking the “standard” regressors usually present in growth regressions – initial per capita 
GDP, population growth, trade openness, education and private investment – we explore how 
sensitive are total government expenditures and revenues when included together with this 
variable set. Table 5 shows that total government expenditures have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on output growth for the entire sample as well as for the OECD and emerging 
_____________________________ 
20 An IV-GLS estimation does not alter the main findings. 
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economies sub-groups when fixed-effects estimation is carried out. For emerging countries, 
government revenues have a detrimental effect to growth.21 Making use of outlier-robust LAD and 
MM techniques does not alter our results22, nor if one controls for endogeneity issues with panel 
IV-GLS, DIFF-GMM and SYS-GMM. Therefore, the statistically significant negative coefficient 
of total government expenditures is robust across econometric specifications, whereas less clear 
results (insignificance) are attributed to the effects of government revenues on output growth. As 
an additional robustness exercise, conducting the same analysis with annual data instead doesn’t 
alter qualitatively our previous findings. 
[Table 5] 
  
4.3.1. Budgetary Economic Decomposition 
In order to assess the impact of different budgetary sub-components on output growth, we 
estimate the following baseline specification: 
 11 0 0 1it it it i it it t i ity y y Z Fα β β γ η ν ε−− = + + + + + +   (8) 
where 1−− itit yy represents again the growth rate of real GDP per capita, and 0iy is the initial value 
of the real GDP per capita. itZ 1  is a vector of control variables; itF  is a vector of budgetary 
component(s) of interest, either from the expenditure or revenue side); iν , tη correspond to the 
country-specific fixed effect and time-fixed effect, respectively. Finally, itε  is some unobserved 
zero mean white noise-type column vector satisfying the standard assumptions. γββα ,,, 10  are 
unknown parameter vectors to be estimated. itZ 1  includes labour force participation rate, 
population growth, education, private investment.  
We know that a typical business cycle correlation might imply that when growth falls, 
government expenditure increases and tax revenues would typically decrease. Furthermore, an 
expansionary fiscal policy can stimulate aggregate demand and thus growth. To check the 
importance of these correlations a control variable unemployment has been included in the model, 
because it is the variable that mostly varies with the business cycle.  
Given our benchmark equation (8) together with its respective set of controls, we now move to 
the inclusion of different sub-components of government revenues and expenditures. In Table 6 
(panel A) we include each item, one at a time. 
[Table 6] 
_____________________________ 
21 Running an IV-GLS estimator enforces our results and increases the magnitude of the coefficient estimates. 
22 Given that outliers do not seem to strongly affect the total number of observations nor the coefficient estimates, for 
the remainder of the paper we shall focus solely on fixed-effects and on endogeneity-related econometric techniques 
(mostly panel IV-GLS and GMM). 
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Inspecting first the revenues’ (panel A1) we observe that each component does not 
significantly affect growth in OECD countries. However, domestic taxes on goods and services 
have a positive effect on output growth for the full sample and emerging economies sub-group, but 
not for the OECD. This may seem counterintuitive, but Helms (1985) and Mofidi and Stone 
(1990) found that taxes spent on publicly provided productive inputs tend to enhance growth.23 For 
the  emerging economies group, taxes on income, profits and capital gains have a statistically 
significant negative impact on growth, whereas taxes on payroll or workforce has a reverse effect. 
24  
Turning to the expenditure side (panel A2), final government consumption has a significantly 
negative effect on output growth for the full and OECD samples. Indeed, economic theory 
suggests a variety of explanations for the negative relationship between government spending and 
growth. First, government spending can crowd out private spending.25 Second, the level of 
government spending may proxy other government intrusions into the workings of the private 
sector, especially regulations which restrain economic growth and efficiency. Empirically, our 
results are in line with the works by Landau (1983, 1986), Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro (1991), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), who have found a negative effect of government consumption on 
growth.  
Still in Table 6 (panel A), for the OECD sub-group, apart from public investment, which 
appears with a positive but insignificant coefficient, all remaining spending components adversely 
affect growth, in particular expenditures with wages and consumption spending. For the full 
sample and emerging economies sub-group, public investment appears with a significantly 
negative coefficient. Possibly inefficient and bureaucratic public sectors may generate lobbying, 
rent-seeking and other non-productive outcomes and activities that erode potentially the positive 
contribution coming from such investment. This is also in line with the literature reviewed before 
(notably Devarajan et al., 1996, and Prichett, 1996). 
In addition, we observe that interest payments and subsidies have a negative effect on GDP per 
capita growth, the latter eventually due to the fact that it creates deadweight loss inefficiencies 
when distorting the market from its own natural equilibrium.26  
_____________________________ 
23 Theoretically, in Barro-style models, increases in taxes can enhance, have no effect or impede growth depending, in 
particular, on the initial level of taxes as well as how revenues are spent. 
24 Most growth models predict that taxes on investment and income have a detrimental effect on growth. These taxes 
affect the growth rate through a direct channel, reducing the private returns to accumulation. On empirical grounds, 
the effects of taxes on growth are not so clear and most research has focused on OECD countries. 
25 In theory, government expenditure can be allocated to growth enhancing infrastructure and education but outlays 
also go for redistribution or government-mandated consumption, which does not improve productivity. 
26 As a sensitivity exercise (not shown) we have repeated the analysis without labour force participation and 
unemployment. A few differences are worth mentioning. On the revenue side the statistical significance is lower, 
particularly with respect to domestic taxes on goods and services, which are no longer significant in any regression. 
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As a next step we include all components of each budgetary block simultaneously in regression 
(8). Table 6, Panel B, reports the results for both the revenue and expenditure blocks. As when 
included individually, domestic taxes on goods and services appear with a statistically significant 
positive coefficient in the growth regression. Regarding taxes on income, profits and capital gains, 
the negative significance is absent in the emerging economies sub-group, but it is present for the 
full sample. As regards the OECD sub-group, revenue variables are never significant in per capita 
GDP growth equations. 
Taking account of endogeneity problems (with a corresponding panel IV-GLS approach – not 
shown) increases the significance level in most coefficients, in particular the basic set of controls 
(negative effect of unemployment for both the full and OECD samples; negative effect of 
population growth. Most revenues’ coefficients for the OECD sub-group remain insignificant.27  
Regarding the expenditure items in Panel B2, on average, the R-squares are somewhat higher 
than when disaggregated revenues are included in the regressions. Overall, evidence suggests a 
higher importance attributed to government expenditures than to revenues. Apart from expected 
signs on the basic set of controls as already discussed, a closer inspection indicates that wage 
spending keeps its negative impact on growth equations, similarly as to when it is included 
individually in the regression, although not statistically significant. Government final consumption 
expenditure is detrimental to growth.  As with the case of government revenues, when endogeneity 
is taken into account, most coefficients increase their significance levels with “right” sign 
estimates. Moreover, R-squares increase from FE to IV-GLS estimation in every specification. 
 
4.4. Functional spending 
Government spending can play an essential role in economic development by maintaining law 
and order, providing economic infrastructure, harmonizing conflicts between private and social 
interests, increasing labour productivity through education and health and enhancing export 
industries. Hence, in terms of the functional decomposition of government expenditures, we 
differentiate the effects from spending on education, health, and social security (and welfare), 
which constitute the main items of government spending. 
In Table 7, Panel A, each of the above spending categories is included in the regression one at 
a time. For reasons of parsimony we do not report the full set of coefficient estimates. Regarding 
social security spending, it has a statistically negative effect on growth in the OECD sub-group. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Taxes on income become statistically significant and negative in specification 1, thereby adversely affecting output 
growth. On the expenditure side results are kept qualitatively unchanged. 
27 Alternatively, running system-GMM for the full sample (not shown) removes any statistically significance out of the 
revenue’s categories, confirming Easterly and Rebelo’s (1993) claim that taxes are difficulty to isolate empirically. 
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This is in accordance with e.g. Landau (1983, 1986), Barro (1991) and Grier and Tullock (1989) 
who found a negative relationship between social expenditures and growth.  
In Panel B, the three variables of interest are included simultaneously in each regression. In 
Panel B, the same conclusions apply with the addition that government expenditure on education 
now affects positively growth in the emerging economies sub-group. It has been argued that 
investment in human capital like education (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) and health (Devarajan 
et al., 1996) has positive effects on growth. 
[Table 7] 
 
4.5. The cyclicality of functional spending 
 The cyclicality of government expenditure is also an important issue, notably from a policy 
making perspective. Therefore, we assess the cyclicality of the three sub-categories previously 
discussed: education, health, and social security and welfare spending. Changes in expenditure 
patterns may arise from discretionary actions by policy makers or from the operation of automatic 
stabilizers (see notably Granado et al., 2010). Our analysis is an encompassing one since we i) 
consider, besides education and health, also government expenditure on social security and 
welfare,28 ii) and use a substantially large time span (1970-2008).  
 Most studies find that fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries and countercyclical 
or acyclical in advanced ones.29 A number of explanations have been put forward to justify the 
different cyclical pattern in different groups of countries (see, Tornell and Lane (1999) or Gavin 
and Perotti (2007) for review). With this in mind, we transform our spending variables into log 
levels, deflated with the CPI at 2000 prices (which matches the same reference year for real GDP). 
Following the literature we estimate: 
 0 1 1 2it it it it it t i itEXP Y BB TOTα β β β η ν ε−= + + + + + +   (9)  
where itEXP  is the change in the real value of the log of the expenditure item of interest and itY  is 
the real GDP growth rate. 1−itBB  is the government’s budget balance (% GDP), which captures the 
potential effect of borrowing constraints on public spending. Countries with high initial budget 
deficits are perceived to be at a greater risk of debt default and as a result have a lower access to 
capital markets during recessions. They would be expected to exhibit a higher degree of pro-
cyclicality. itTOT  is an index (its change) of the country’s terms of trade.
30 The remaining usual 
_____________________________ 
28 These three functional spending categories accounted for 41.6%, 54.7%, and 34.5% of government spending, 
respectively in the full, OECD and developing country-group over the full time span considered in our sample. 
29 See, inter alia, Tornell and Lane (1999), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008). 
30 The rate of change in the terms of trade is meant to capture the effects of external shocks on fiscal cyclicality. The 
impact of external shocks is often more pronounced in developing countries due to the close connection between the 
budget balance and the foreign sector. 
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assumptions apply, in particular iν  and tη  are country specific and time effects – the latter to 
control for global shocks. 0β  is the parameter of interest, measuring the degree of cyclicality: a 
positive estimate implies a pro-cyclical behaviour; a negative one indicates a countercyclical 
behaviour of the respective spending items. 
 The potential endogeneity is taken care by running SYS-GMM with appropriate lags of the 
regressors used as instruments.31 We first estimate (9) without control variables using annual data 
for the full, OECD and Emerging and Developing (E+D) samples (not shown). Most GDP growth 
coefficients are statistically insignificant for all four spending categories, apart from evidence of 
countercyclical total government expenditures attributed to the OECD sub-group (which is in line 
with the literature) and a countercyclical pattern for expenditures in social security and welfare in 
the different samples, in line with Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) and Darby and Melitz (2008). In 
Table 8 we report estimated coefficients now with the full control set included. For the OECD the 
government expenditure coefficient remains significant. Moreover, we keep the countercyclical 
result for spending on social security and welfare (for both the full and OECD samples).  
[Table 8] 
 Given that public expenditures may respond asymmetrically during good and bad times, we 
test this hypothesis by accounting for so-called good and bad times. Therefore, we define good 
times as those in which the output gap is positive and bad times when the output gap is negative.32 
Our results suggest that for the OECD group total government expenditure is countercyclical in 
both good and bad times, with the coefficient in bad times being 50% larger in absolute value 
(more negative). We keep the acyclicality result for education and health expenditures, and the 
countercyclical result for spending in social security and welfare is also maintained. In fact, in 
good times the estimated coefficient for social security spending is larger in magnitude (more 
negative). For emerging and developing countries our results are in line with Jaimovich and 
Panizza (2007) who report that after controlling for endogeneity, total government spending is 
acyclical in both good and bad times. 
 All in all, most spending items are acyclical, with the exception of total expenditures and 
spending on social security and welfare where evidence points to counter-cyclicality, particularly 
in OECD countries. 
 
_____________________________ 
31 Fixed effects estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
32 The output gap is computed as the difference between actual and potential, and potential GDP is obtainded by 
means of HP filter extraction. As a robustness check, filtering instead with either the Baxter-King or Christiano-
Fitzgerald alternatives didn’t qualitatively alter our main results. 
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4.6. Non-linearities in budgetary decomposition 
An additional exercise is to further explore possible effects coming from non-linearities in the 
context of the budgetary decomposition. The results in the previous sections suggest that the 
reduction of budget deficits can be conducive to higher growth. Of interest is whether these results 
hold for all countries (and sub-groups) in the sample(s), in particular, for countries that have 
already achieved a modicum of macroeconomic (fiscal) stability.33 Therefore, we spit the 
sample(s) into countries labelled “above” or “below”, based on a given fiscal threshold. 
Specifically, an “above” type country is defined as a country that maintained on average (over 
time) a budget deficit below 3% of GDP. Conversely, a “below” type country is such that it 
maintained an average budget deficit above 3% of GDP.34 We also repeat the procedure with a 
60% of GDP government debt threshold (that is, the “above” type country is one that maintained 
an average debt ratio below 60% of GDP over the period; mutatis mutandis for the “below” 
case).35  
In Table 9 we report the results with the 3% deficit threshold. Needless to say that some of 
these results require care in interpretation given the truncated nature of the resulting sample and 
reduced number of available observations. First, both the unemployment rate and the dependency 
ratio appear with a negative and statistically high coefficient in several regressions.  
In the fixed-effects specifications 7-12 for the revenue panel both in the full sample and in the 
emerging economies sub-group, some points are worthwhile emphasizing. Apart from retaining 
the positive coefficient on domestic taxes on goods and services that we have commented on 
before, the case of the below 3% threshold, for the full sample, now registers a statistically positive 
coefficient on the contributions to social security, which previously where insignificant (but 
positive still) in Table 6. For the case above 3%, the emerging economies sub-group retain the 
statistically negative impact of social security contributions allocated in Table 6 for the entire 
emerging group (though now with an increased magnitude of the estimate). For this group of 
countries, taxes on income, profits and capital gains is detrimental to growth in the below 3% 
deficit set of economies.  
_____________________________ 
33 On the same line see, e.g., Gupta et al. (2005). 
34 The 3% value is an ad-hoc number stemming from the European Union Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rationale. 
For the OECD sub-group, countries classified as being “above” average, lower deficits, are: Australia, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Slovakiam Spain, Switzerland, UK and US. The “below” average ones, higher deficits, are: Austria, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey. 
35 The 60% limit for the debt ratio is related to the SGP framework, although also endogenously computed in Afonso 
and Jalles (2011), above which government debt is detrimental to growth – see further details therein. According to 
this threshold for the OECD sub-group, countries “above” average, lower debt ratio, are: Australia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US. The “below” average ones, higher debt ratio, 
are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Portugal. 
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Furthermore, for the OECD sub-sample, coefficient estimates which were entirely insignificant 
in Table 6 now appear with statistically meaningful coefficients. Moreover, it is interesting to 
observe that depending whether we take the below or above 3% threshold set of economies, 
coefficient signs may be reversed (e.g., negative impact of taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains as well as taxes on payroll or workforce for the above 3% group, but positive ones for the 
below 3% group). For instance, this can imply that with higher fiscal imbalances, additional taxes 
on income depress growth. 
Third, for the expenditure set of regressions, results are less controversial or dubious in their 
“expected” or “right” coefficient signs. As before, we have negative effects of government 
spending on wages, final consumption and public investment (the latter notably for the emerging 
economies sample, regardless of the deficit threshold). 
As a robustness exercise we have conducted a sensitivity analysis based on the exclusion of 
labour force participation, unemployment and dependency ratio (not shown). Whereas coefficients, 
magnitudes and statistical significance levels in the expenditure-based regressions are kept 
unchanged, the same does not apply to specifications 7-12, concerning revenues. In particular, we 
lose significance in all revenue components for the OECD below 3% sub-group (the results of 
Table 6). For the OECD above 3% case, domestic taxes on goods and services have a statistically 
negative coefficient and taxes on property a statistically positive coefficient, both of which were 
absent before (we loose significance on the remaining variables) though. All in all, results with 
revenue components are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular controls, and hence 
should be interpreted with care. 
Finally, we have redefined our deficit threshold such that now instead of averaging over the 
countries time span, we take each 5-year average period to assess/determine the above and below 
3% classification. Moreover, as before but now based on the new criterion, we did the analysis 
with the labour force participation, unemployment and dependency ratio excluded from the set of 
regressors. Reporting all these would lead us far off-track. A typical result is the confirmation that 
government expenditures’ components are generally detrimental to growth irrespectively of the 
country group and deficit threshold classification. As for revenues’ components, results are mixed, 
unclear or contradictory depending on the set of regressors included, geographical sample and 
deficit rule used. 
[Table 9] 
As described above we also used a 60% threshold for the average public debt-to-GDP ratio 
over a country’s time series span. For reasons of parsimony results are available upon request. 
Overall, we get mixed evidence from revenues’ components coefficient estimates. As for the 
expenditures’ components, government spending on wages and government final consumption 
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appear with statistically significant negative signs. Redoing these estimations with the truncated 
set of basic regressors or using the 5-year average period debt-rule instead of the country average, 
doesn’t alter the main results (not shown). 
Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between output growth, government debt-to-GDP ratio 
and the budget balance ratio according to the 3% (60%) fiscal thresholds classification. The pattern 
arising is that countries with average lower debt ratios and with lower budget deficits are 
associated with higher GDP real growth rates. 
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
4.7. Panel Granger-causality tests 
It is also important to understand whether expenditures (revenues) Granger cause per capita 
GDP (and TFP), or the reverse applies or even if one finds two-way bidirectional causality. In 
previous studies, Hakro (2009) finds evidence suggesting that government expenditures are growth 
inducing, and a larger size of the government will certainly create opportunities of employment 
and hence growth, and subsequently higher income per capita. In a related sample Kumar (2009) 
infers instead that Wagner’s Law does hold.36  Yuk (2005) takes a long term perspective on UK 
time series and, although support for Wagner’s Law is sensitive to the choice of the sample period, 
there is evidence that GDP growth Granger-causes the share of government spending in GDP. 
Loizides and Vamvoukas (2004) using a bivariate ECM conclude that government size Granger 
causes economic growth in all countries in the short and long run; economic growth Granger 
causes increases in the relative size of government in Greece, and when inflation is included, in the 
UK. 
_____________________________ 
36 A stylised fact of public economics about the long-run tendency for public expenditure to grow relative to some 
national income aggregate such as GDP. 
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We find little evidence of robust Granger causality from per capita GDP to government 
expenditure37 across econometric specifications, with only one model indicating a negative short 
and long-run effect of total government expenditure on output growth.  
However, there is stronger evidence supporting the reverse relationship, that is, from GDP to 
expenditures, therefore favouring the idea of Wagner’s Law. In particular, there are significant 
short and long-run effects, we reject the null of no Granger-causality using our two-step Hansen 
incremental test, and diagnostics are well behaved (Table 10).38  
[Table 10] 
With respect to causality running from government expenditures to TFP we find evidence 
supporting it, together with positive and significant short and long-run coefficients. For the OECD 
sub-group results are similar (not shown).  
 
4.8. Cross-sectional dependence 
As discussed in Section 3 it is natural to suspect about the existence of cross-sectional 
dependence across homogeneous groups of economies. Therefore, we use Pesaran’s CD test39 for 
the OECD sub-samples and we find a statistic of 15.26, corresponding to a p-value of zero (the 
null hypothesis is cross-sectional independence).  
In Table 11 we run benchmark type growth regressions for this OECD sample using both a 
Driscoll-Kraay robust estimation approach and the Pesaran’s Common Correlated Effects Pooled 
Estimator (CCEP). We restrict ourselves to the examination of seven main variables of interest: 
total government expenditures and revenues (% GDP), their respective growth rates, and the 
functional decomposition of government expenditures (education, health, and social security and 
welfare). Similarly to our earlier results we find negative and statistically significant coefficients 
for the effect of total government expenditures and revenues on output growth (the latter only true 
when running the Driscoll-Kraay regression). We find a negative effect of revenues’ growth rate, 
confirming previous results. As for specifications 5 and 10 both government spending on 
education and health yield insignificant coefficients, though social security spending yields a 
statistically negative coefficient – reinforcing our previous results.  
[Table 11] 
_____________________________ 
37 Both total government expenditures and revenues (% GDP) were converted to nominal levels, deflated using the 
CPI and scaled by population. Hence, we have real GDP per capita and either real total government expenditures or 
revenues in per capita terms as well (so that both variables of interest are comparable). 
38 Redoing the analysis for the OECD sub-sample (not shown), we get slightly stronger results favouring Granger 
causality from government spending to GDP for a positive short-run effect in 3 out of 6 models. Nevertheless, there 
does not seem to be a significant long-run effect. For the OECD the reverse relationship still holds with evidence of 
Granger-causality from GDP to government spending, as well as positive and significant short and long-run effects in 
both the pooled OLS and FE models. 




We have used cross-sectional/time series data for a panel of 155 developed and developing 
countries for the period 1970-2008, in order to assess the potential linkage between fiscal policy 
developments and economic growth. More specifically, we focused on a number of econometric 
issues that can have an important bearing on the results, notably simultaneity, endogeneity, (two-
way) causality, the relevance of nonlinearities, cross-section dependence, and threshold effects. 
Our results from the model selection-based techniques suggest a negative impact of 
government spending and its components, whereas as for government revenues (and components) 
these techniques seem to indicate they may have a positive impact on output growth. Graphically, 
a two-way scatter plot of government expenditures and revenues against the GDP per capita 
growth indicate a positive relationship in both cases for the emerging economies group, and the 
existence of a negative relationship for the OECD. Though informative these simple descriptive 
statistics should be taken with care. What one can undoubtedly conclude, as confirmed by the 
Kernel density estimates, is that government expenditures and revenues ratios have increased over 
time with a movement of the distribution towards the right-hand-side. 
Our evidence also suggests that for the full sample revenues have no significant impact on 
growth (though their growth rate has a positive impact) whereas government expenditures appear 
with highly significant negative signs. The same is true for the OECD group with the addition that 
now total government revenues have a negative impact on growth (however, when included 
together with other regressors it looses significance). If we decompose revenues, our empirical 
evidence is weak and unclear as to concrete effects, with the more general conclusion that taxes on 
income are usually detrimental to growth. Regarding expenditures, results are more robust and 
consistent across samples and econometric specifications; in particular public wages, interest 
payments, subsidies and government consumption are found to negatively affect output growth. 
Concerning the functional classification of government spending, expenditures on social security 
and welfare are detrimental to growth, whereas both government spending on education and health 
boosts growth. Most results are confirmed even after we address cross-sectional dependence. 
Granger causality tests find relatively weak evidence supporting causality running for 
expenditures or revenues to GDP per capita (and TFP), but the reverse appears to be consistently 
stronger notably for spending, that is, evidence of the Wagner Law. For the OECD these effects 
are usually more pronounced. Interestingly, and depending whether we take the below or above 
3% threshold budget deficit set of economies, we observe a negative impact, on growth, of taxes 
on income, profits and capital gains as well as taxes on payroll or workforce for the above 3% 
group, but a positive one for the below 3% group of countries. 
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Table 1: Extreme Bounds Analysis (full sample) 
Variables taxproperty_gdp taxpayroll_gdp taxsscgovrev_gdp govexpwages_gdp govcons_gdp pubinv_gdp 
EBA lower 
bound 
0.5886** -0.7356** 0.0344** -0.1195*** -0.1047*** -0.071** 
 (2.0070) (-2.2678) (2.0750) (-3.2197) (-5.2472) (-2.324) 
EBA upper 
bound 
0.9026*** -0.6513** 0.0464*** -0.0736** -0.0489** -0.062** 
 (2.8357) (-1.9777) (2.8086) (-1.9908) (-2.4324) (-2.010) 
Variables totgovrev_gdp totgovexp_gdp taxrev_gdp domtaxesgs_gdp taxesincome_gdp 
EBA lower 
bound 
-0.0433*** -0.0609*** -0.0945*** 0.0771** -0.0735**
 (-3.0642) (-4.2444) (-4.0166) (2.0633) (-2.3915)
EBA upper 
bound 
-0.0265** -0.0253** -0.0420** 0.1431*** -0.0598*
 (-1.9788) (-1.9844) (-2.1873) (3.5576) (-1.9658)
Note: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  
 
Table 2: BMA-Determinants of GDP per capita growth 
Model gdppcgr                    
Variable PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign 
Spec. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
inigdp 1.00 - 0.68 - 0.88 - 0.92 - 0.98 - 0.84 - 0.56 - 0.65 - 0.70 - 0.81 - 
Scale/size                     
laborf 1.00 + 0.97 + 0.91 -               
popgr       0.95 - 0.2  0.99 - 0.88 - 0.99 - 0.53 - 0.69 - 
land_area 1.00 - 0.96 - 0.88 - 0.85 - 1.00 - 0.99 - 0.21  0.99 - 0.51 - 1.00 - 
Living conditions                     
mortality 1.00 -                   
fertility 1.00 -                   
depratio_wa 0.00                  0.00  
urban_pop 1.00 -                   
unemp 0.48                    
Policy/institutional                     
openness   0.98 +               0.53 + 
termstrade   0.98 +                 
reer   0.99 +                 
fhindex   0.61 +               0.77 + 
corrind   0.73 -               1.00 - 
Education                     
primary_enrol     0.88 +               
secondary_enrol     0.81 +             1.00 + 
tertiary_enrol     0.67 +               
literates     0.91 +               
Government                     
totgovrev_gdp         1.00 +         0.81 - 
domtaxesgs_gdp             0.97 -       
taxesincome_gdp             0.99 +       
taxproperty_gdp             0.90 +       
taxpayroll_gdp             0.99 +       
taxsscgovrev_gdp             0.99 +       
totgovexp_gdp           0.99 -         
govexpwages_gdp               0.99 +     
intpay_gdp               0.99 -     
subs_gdp               0.99 -     
govcons_gdp               0.01      
pubinv_gdp               0.03      
govexpedu_gdp                 0.99 -   
govexphea_gdp                 0.99 +   
govexpss_gdp                 0.98 +   
debtavtermmat       0.94 -             
debt_gdp       0.73 - 0.30  0.23          
R-squared 0.22  0.10  0.14  0.22  0.16  0.10  0.19  0.36  0.06  0.37  
Note: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth over the sample full period, 1970-2010. The variable description is in the main text. The BMA analysis 
yields the posterior probabilities of inclusion (PIPs) and the sign certainty index of a relationship. A sign is given to the PIPs greater than 0.5. No sign means the sign of 





Table 3: Top 3 BMA-type Models and their posterior probabilities 
 
 1 2 3 
Dependent gdppcgr tfpnew_60gr kgr 
Regressors    
inigdppc *, s *, s * 
gdp2000  *, s  
pop  *, s  
laborf *, s  * 
landarea *, s  * 
depratio_wa *   
openness *, s   
fhindex *, s   
demo *, s   
secondary_enrol *, s   
totgovrev_gdp *, s   
govexpwages_gdp  *, s *, s 
intpay_gdp  *, s *, s 
subs_gdp  *, s *, s 
govcons_gdp  *, s *, s 
pubinv_gdp  *, s *, s 
R-squared 0.37 0.26 0.74 
Note: This table presents the top models for per capita GDP, TFP, and per worker capital stock,  ranked by their R-
squares in the whole sample. The variable description is in the main text. * and s, denote inclusion of the variable in 
the BMA regression and whether it reported a statistically significant coefficient, respectively. 
 
 








Estimation FE (within) 
Sample ALL 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
inigdppc -2.78***     -3.69*** -2.65*** -3.29*** -1.98*** -1.09 3.39** 
 (0.459)     (0.603) (0.502) (0.650) (0.443) (1.847) (1.309) 
totgovexp_gdp  -0.06**    -0.07***  -0.07**    
  (0.023)    (0.022)  (0.027)    
totgovrev_gdp   -0.04    -0.02  -0.01   
   (0.038)    (0.043)  (0.040)   
totgovexpgr    1.39    -4.75    
    (7.249)    (7.903)    
totgovrevgr     27.01***    28.47***   
     (7.427)    (6.610)   
gfcf_gdp      0.14*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.16***   
      (0.040) (0.045) (0.051) (0.047)   
Obs. 1,395 561 812 446 664 539 783 435 649 392 607 
R-squared 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.03 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within). The dependent variable is either real GDPpc growth (gdppcgr), the initial level of government 
expenditure (%GDP) or the initial level of government revenues (%GDP), as identified in the first row. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for 




Table 5: Total General Government Revenue and Expenditure and Growth, 5-year averages 
 
Dependent Variable: Real GDPpc growth Fixed-Effects (within) FE-LAD MM LSDV-C DIFF-GMM SYS-GMM 
Sample All  OECD  Emerging  All 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
                 
inigdppc -4.96*** -6.00*** -2.53*** -2.45*** -3.87*** -7.15*** -4.22*** -4.94*** -0.68*** -0.35* -5.17*** -5.40*** -4.61*** -8.66*** -0.71*** -0.07 
 (0.768) (0.820) (0.439) (0.343) (1.308) (1.535) (0.733) (0.805) (0.097) (0.180) (0.577) (0.611) (1.373) (1.446) (0.222) (0.289) 
popgr -0.48* -0.31 -0.91** -1.27*** -1.00** -1.68** -0.56*** -0.45*** -0.87*** -0.55** -0.46* -0.23 -0.30 0.01 -0.36** -0.33 
 (0.267) (0.192) (0.339) (0.359) (0.463) (0.716) (0.208) (0.164) (0.155) (0.227) (0.274) (0.300) (0.429) (0.206) (0.153) (0.231) 
trade_gdp 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.02*** 0.02 -0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.01* 0.01 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.022) (0.038) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009) (0.025) (0.022) (0.006) (0.005) 
gfcf_gdp 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.13** 0.11** 0.30*** 0.32** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.10 0.01 0.30*** 0.25*** 
 (0.045) (0.039) (0.052) (0.046) (0.108) (0.120) (0.044) (0.037) (0.028) (0.044) (0.029) (0.032) (0.071) (0.076) (0.043) (0.039) 
education 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.05** 0.04 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.01 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.030) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) 
totgovrev_gdp -0.03  -0.03  -0.18***  -0.02  -0.05***  -0.02  -0.06  -0.03  
 (0.040)  (0.035)  (0.041)  (0.033)  (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.067)  (0.032)  
totgovexp_gdp  -0.08***  -0.12***  -0.26***  -0.08***  -0.05***  -0.07**  -0.10***  -0.07*** 
  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.086)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.023) 
Obs. 746 515 202 191 173 113 732 504 746 515 733 503 564 389 746 515 
R-squared 0.23 0.30 0.27 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.20 0.24         
Hansen (p-value)             0.09 0.50 0.37 0.95 
AB AR(1) (p-value)             0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) (p-value)             0.46 0.15 0.54 0.07 
Note: The models are estimated by OLS (OLS-pooled), OLS with Least Absolute Deviation robust version (OLS-LAD), MM estimator a la Yohai (1987) which efficiently makes uses of both the S and Huber-type M estimators using iteratively reweighted 
least squares (IRWLS), Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV-C), Within Fixed Effects (FE-within), Two-Step robust Difference GMM (DIFF-GMM) and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter two methods lagged 
regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument 
set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 6: Growth equations with Budgetary Economic Decomposition when fiscal variables are introduced 
one at a time in the benchmark equations, 5-year averages 
Dependent Variable:  
Real GDPpc growth 
Fixed Effects (within) 
Sample All OECD Emerg  All OECD Emerg 
 Panel A1  Panel B1 
Spec. 1 2 3  4 5 6 
Revenue Variables        
taxrev_gdp 0.06 0.01 0.03     
 (0.127) (0.192) (0.211)     
domtaxesgs_gdp 0.39*** 0.01 0.39*  0.50*** -0.28  
 (0.117) (0.242) (0.210)  (0.163) (0.489)  
taxesincome_gdp -0.07 -0.06 -0.81**  -0.40* -0.22 -2.24 
 (0.060) (0.091) (0.378)  (0.205) (0.355) (1.425) 
taxproperty_gdp -0.52 -0.31 0.08  -0.85 0.67  
 (0.693) (0.505) (1.972)  (0.760) (0.541)  
taxpayroll_gdp 0.65 0.88 10.30***  -0.05 0.50 -12.96 
 (1.089) (0.538) (1.841)  (0.763) (0.766) (8.861) 
taxsscgovrev_gdp 0.03 -0.01 0.20  0.11 -0.02 2.57** 
 (0.044) (0.069) (0.182)  (0.173) (0.218) (1.050) 
 Panel A2  Panel B2 
Expenditure Variables        
govexpwages_gdp -0.03 -0.57*** 0.15  -0.23 -0.18 -0.20 
 (0.159) (0.153) (0.225)  (0.177) (0.197) (0.218) 
intpay_gdp -0.00 -0.26** -0.01  0.08 0.55 -0.12 
 (0.003) (0.127) (0.010)  (0.051) (0.390) (0.422) 
subs_gdp 0.00 -0.08*** -0.00  -0.04** -0.11** 0.17** 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.003)  (0.019) (0.042) (0.064) 
govcons_gdp -0.19*** -0.45*** 0.02  -0.28*** -0.34 -0.22 
 (0.051) (0.147) (0.142)  (0.084) (0.220) (0.134) 
pubinv_gdp -0.25*** 0.69 -0.38**  -0.28* -0.46** -0.68*** 
 (0.080) (0.748) (0.169)  (0.139) (0.199) (0.176) 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within). The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth. Different individual regressions using the set of 
regressors and controls present in table 6 were performed and only coefficients of interest are reported for economy of space. Revenue and expenditure variables were 
included individually in each regression in Panel A. Simultaneously inclusion of different budgetary components was performed in Panel B. Full results are available 
from the authors upon request. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Time fixed effects were 
included, but are not reported. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 7: Growth equations with functional spending: fiscal variables are introduced simultaneously (Panel 
A) and one at a time (Panel B), benchmark equations, 5-year averages 
Dependent Variable:  
Real GDPpc growth 
Fixed Effects (within) 
Sample All OECD Emerg 
Spec. 1 2 3 
Panel A    
govexpedu_gdp 0.29 0.11 -0.44 
 (0.358) (0.306) (0.724) 
govexphea_gdp -0.30 -0.26 2.55 
 (0.302) (0.286) (2.117) 
govexpss_gdp -0.10 -0.42*** 0.49 
 (0.115) (0.093) (0.283) 
Obs. 223 96 56 
R-squared 0.24 0.32 0.67 
Panel B    
govexpedu_gdp 0.04 -0.00 0.62* 
 (0.169) (0.128) (0.332) 
govexphea_gdp -0.24 -0.30 1.18 
 (0.334) (0.387) (1.812) 
govexpss_gdp -0.09 -0.42*** 0.06 
 (0.119) (0.087) (0.200) 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within). The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth. Different individual regressions using the set of 
regressors and controls present in table 14b. (in bold) were performed and only coefficients of interested are reported for economy of space. Expenditure components 
(education, health and social security) were included individually in each regression. Full results are available upon request. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis Time fixed effects and a constant were included, but are not reported*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 8: Cyclicality of public expenditures (functional approach), annual data (with control variables) 
Dependent Variable Total Gov. Exp. Gov. Exp. Education Gov. Exp. Health Gov. Exp. Social Security and Welfare 
Sample All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
gdppcgr -0.49 -4.56** 0.45 -0.29 -0.51* -0.08 -0.05 -0.24 -0.08 -0.83** -3.63*** -0.34 
 (0.841) (2.027) (0.984) (0.269) (0.304) (0.264) (0.123) (0.349) (0.087) (0.355) (1.281) (0.258) 
ToT gr -0.03 -0.12*** -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02** -0.03 -0.00 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.024) (0.007) 
govbal_gdp(-1) 0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01* 0.00 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Observations 772 366 406 673 253 420 521 219 302 492 219 273 
Hansen (p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.05 
AB AR(2) (p-value) 0.06 0.50 0.08 0.31 0.67 0.25 0.27 0.53 0.26 1.00 0.39 0.07 
Note: The models are estimated by Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). Lagged regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is either 
total government expenditures, government expenditures on education, health or social security and welfare (all in % GDP), as identified in the first row. “E+M” denote 
the emerging and developing countries sub-group. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of 
the instrument set. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term 
has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 9: Growth equations with Budgetary Decomposition of Public Budget Balance (Revenue and Expenditure), 5-year averages – different samples with non-
linear effects of fiscal policy, according to the 3% Budget Deficit threshold 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Real GDPpc growth
Fixed Effects (within) 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg 
 >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
                   
inigdppc -3.83*** -5.31*** -2.66 -3.40** -2.02 -8.27*** -5.95* -16.35*** -21.15*** -5.14 -3.82** -20.83*** -4.15 -6.25*** -4.43 -3.05** -7.47*** -13.06*** 
 (1.042) (1.210) (1.640) (1.322) (1.526) (2.813) (3.181) (2.565) (3.905) (2.962) (1.417) (2.893) (4.787) (1.697) (2.763) (1.037) (1.341) (1.651) 
lfp 0.06 -0.12 -0.02 -0.23 0.02 -0.24 0.08 -0.32** 0.79** -1.57*** 0.20 -0.04 -0.19 0.26 0.19 -0.23 0.06 0.37*** 
 (0.100) (0.112) (0.166) (0.158) (0.041) (0.215) (0.214) (0.117) (0.226) (0.277) (0.236) (0.140) (0.533) (0.162) (0.132) (0.141) (0.109) (0.058) 
unemp -0.06 -0.14 -0.07 -0.18 -0.01 -0.15 -0.58*** 0.01 -1.74*** -0.80*** 0.28 0.11 0.32 -0.12 0.05 -0.24** 0.37 -0.20 
 (0.065) (0.085) (0.265) (0.105) (0.097) (0.194) (0.123) (0.155) (0.101) (0.194) (0.259) (0.182) (0.427) (0.115) (0.171) (0.105) (0.291) (0.112) 
popgr 0.23 -0.14 -1.20* 0.14 -1.62** -1.34 0.12 1.64 -1.19 5.90*** -2.92** -7.12** -0.14 -0.31** -2.23** -2.08*** -9.36*** -6.45** 
 (0.900) (0.183) (0.554) (0.812) (0.666) (0.853) (0.685) (0.997) (1.178) (1.187) (1.090) (2.334) (2.054) (0.108) (0.795) (0.496) (1.990) (2.262) 
gfcf_gdp 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.16 -0.03 0.18*** 0.37*** 0.06 0.36** -1.44*** -0.82*** 0.38* 0.59*** 0.38** -0.23 0.21 -0.02 0.38** 0.66*** 
 (0.053) (0.063) (0.203) (0.099) (0.053) (0.103) (0.229) (0.139) (0.101) (0.219) (0.183) (0.095) (0.179) (0.139) (0.176) (0.095) (0.158) (0.108) 
education 0.04*** 0.02 0.01 0.03** 0.02 0.09 0.07** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.02* 0.01 -0.18* 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.085) (0.031) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.052) (0.094) (0.017) (0.052) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.085) 
depratio_wa -0.09*** -0.24*** -0.09 -0.22* -0.05 -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.13** -0.21 -0.32** 0.03 -0.19* -0.18 -0.30** -0.18** -0.09** 0.25** -0.06 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.055) (0.110) (0.047) (0.066) (0.049) (0.051) (0.153) (0.099) (0.103) (0.088) (0.127) (0.128) (0.061) (0.035) (0.108) (0.064) 
Revenue Variables                   
domtaxesgs_gdp       0.52* 0.30 -0.44 2.70*** 1.17 0.00       
       (0.269) (0.257) (0.455) (0.474) (0.638) (0.374)       
taxesincome_gdp       -0.40 -0.25 -0.92** 4.14*** -0.44 -0.60*       
       (0.265) (0.348) (0.331) (0.933) (0.706) (0.304)       
taxproperty_gdp       -0.35 0.72 1.91 12.72*** -2.81 -1.93       
       (0.768) (2.020) (1.143) (2.770) (2.385) (1.113)       
taxpayroll_gdp       -0.96 0.35 -1.91* 5.74***         
       (1.602) (1.578) (0.933) (1.543)         
taxsscgovrev_gdp       0.09 0.58*** 0.68*** -3.52*** -1.19*** -0.09       
       (0.164) (0.167) (0.134) (0.695) (0.317) (0.416)       
Expenditure Variables                   
govexpwages_gdp             -0.25 -0.19 -0.32*** -0.44** -0.43 -0.66 
             (0.285) (0.233) (0.073) (0.198) (0.251) (0.620) 
intpay_gdp             -4.09 0.18*     
             (5.100) (0.095)     
subs_gdp              -0.08**     
              (0.034)     
govcons_gdp             -0.06 -0.58*** -0.39*** -0.15** -0.53** -0.01 
             (0.157) (0.198) (0.100) (0.060) (0.159) (0.150) 
pubinv_gdp             -0.18 -0.05 -0.12 0.04 -1.16*** -0.53*** 
             (0.157) (0.228) (0.266) (0.311) (0.223) (0.088) 
Observations 202 346 66 109 50 98 48 48 20 23 26 34 47 58 47 68 21 30 
R-squared 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.48 0.39 0.57 0.78 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.90 0.61 0.75 0.66 0.45 0.99 0.87 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within). The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth. “Above” and “below” performers are classified as those having maintained an average (over the country’s time span)  budget deficit below 
3% or over 3%, respectively. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported 





Table 10: Panel Granger-Causality - Total Government Expenditures and GDPpc (full sample) 
Dep.Var. totgovexppc OLS levels Within Group (FE) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument set none none Full Full Reduced Reduced 
Lag1 totgovexppc 0.04 -0.98** -1.63*** -0.14 -0.12 -1.68*** 
 (0.201) (0.395) (0.476) (0.127) (0.073) (0.166) 
Lag1 GDPpc  2.43** 32.76*** 25.28 6.45* 9.49*** 12.29** 
 (0.950) (8.946) (24.939) (3.635) (2.941) (6.223) 
       
Obs. 320 320 226 320 320 320 
R-squared 0.01 0.19     
AB AR(1) (p-value)   0.26 0.29 0.29 0.25 
AB AR(2) (p-value)   0.65 0.31 0.31 0.60 
Hansen p-value   0.01 0.03 0.28 0.61 
Granger causality p-value 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Unobs. Heterogeneity    0.00 0.00 0.00 
LR effect point estimate 2.51* 16.54*** 9.62 5.67 8.47*** 4.59** 
(standard error) (1.287) (3.053) (10.053) (3.649) (2.682) (2.166) 
Note: Our five-year averages dataset was used for the purpose of assessing Granger causality. Year dummies are included in all models (coefficients not reported). 
Figures in parenthesis below point estimates are standard-errors. The GMM results reported here are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. The Hansen test is used to assess the overidentifying restrictions; the test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM estimator. 
The difference Hansen test is used to test the additional moment conditions used by the system GMM estimators in which SYS GMM uses the standard moment 
conditions, while SYS GMM-1 only uses the lagged first-differences of  totgovexp_gdp dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels and SYS-2 only uses 
lagged first-differences of GDPpc dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels. The heterogeneity test is used to test the null that there are no individual effects 
(see text). The Granger causality test examines the null hypothesis that is totgovexp_gdp not Granger-caused by GDPpc; the test statistic is criterion based, using 
restricted and unrestricted models (see main text for details). The LR effect is the point estimate of the long-run effect of GDPpc on totgovexp_gdp. Its standard 
error is approximated using the delta method. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 11: Growth equations with Government Expenditures and Revenues – accounting for Cross-
Sectional Dependence, 5 year averages data – OECD  
 
Dependent Variable:  
Real GDPpc growth 
Discroll Kraay Robust Estimation CCEP 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sample OECD 
inigdppc -0.81*** -0.77*** -0.12 -0.65*** -0.54* -2.45*** -2.53*** -2.12*** -2.83*** -2.47*** 
 (0.221) (0.251) (0.249) (0.169) (0.267) (0.522) (0.555) (0.719) (0.509) (0.802) 
popgr -0.46* -0.23 0.39** 0.02 -0.14 -1.27*** -0.91*** -0.05 -0.83*** -0.18 
 (0.245) (0.187) (0.159) (0.167) (0.183) (0.285) (0.296) (0.384) (0.291) (0.415) 
gfcf_gdp 0.01** 0.01** -0.00 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.03** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) 
openness 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.26*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.038) (0.040) (0.049) (0.039) (0.056) 
education 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) 
totgovexp_gdp -0.06***     -0.12***     
 (0.012)     (0.024)     
totgovrev_gdp  -0.04***     -0.03    
  (0.010)     (0.033)    
totgovrevgr   -35.41***     -35.49***   
   (6.735)     (9.042)   
totgovexpgr    17.45*     15.19  
    (9.007)     (9.498)  
govexpedu_gdp     0.00     -0.31 
     (0.035)     (0.193) 
govexphea_gdp     -0.05     -0.19 
     (0.036)     (0.155) 
govexpss_gdp     -0.10***     -0.14* 
     (0.018)     (0.078) 
Obs. 191 202 142 195 133 191 202 142 195 133 
R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.38 0.27 0.40 0.29 0.39 
Note: The models are estimated with either Driscoll Kraay robust estimator or the Pesaran’s Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator (CCPE) to correct for 
the existence of cross-sectional dependence in the OECD. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each 








Appendix – Sample, variables and sources 
 
Variable Definition/Description Acronym Source 
real GDP per capita  
Gdppc 
World Bank’s Word 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
gross fixed capital formation (% GDP)  Gfcf_gdp WDI 
public investment (% GDP)  Pubinv_gdp WDI 
Total Factor Productivity Variable constructed using growth accounting techniques 
Tfp 
version 6.3 of the Penn 
World Table (PWT) of 
Heston et al. (2009) and 
Barro and Lee’s (2010). 
Government budget surplus or deficit (% of 
GDP)  
 
The government budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of 
GDP. Govbal_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Central Government Debt (% GDP)  Govdebt_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Total Government Revenue (% GDP)  Totgovrev_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Tax revenue (% GDP)  Taxrev_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Domestic taxes on goods and services (% GDP) This includes VAT, excises, profits of fiscal monopoly etc. 
 Domtaxesgs_gdp 
WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly 
(2001) 
Taxes on payroll or work force (% of GDP) This category consists of taxes that are collected from 
employers or the self-employed and that are not earmarked for 
social security schemes. 
Taxpayrool_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% 
GDP) 
 Taxincome_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Taxes on property (% of GDP) Taxes on the use, ownership, or transfer of wealth 
 Taxproperty_gdp 
WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly 
(2001) 
Tax and social security contributions 
government revenue (% of 
GDP) 
Total government revenue from taxes and social security 
contributions Taxssgovrev_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Total Government Expenditure (% GDP)  Totgovexp_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Compensation of employees (% GDP)  Govexpwages_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Interest Payments (% GDP)  Inpay_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Subsidies (% GDP)  Subs_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public Final Consumption Expenditure (% GDP)  Govcons_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public spending on Education (% GDP)  Govexpedu_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public spending on Health (% GDP)  Govexphea_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public spending on Social Security and Welfare 
related (% GDP) 
 Govexpss_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
School attainment average years of schooling in the population over 25 years old 
from the international data on educational attainment Edu Barro and Lee (2010) 
literacy rate (% of people ages 15 to 24)  Literates WDI 
primary school enrolment (% gross)  Primary_enrol WDI 
primary school duration (years)  Primary_dur WDI 
secondary school enrolment (% gross)  Secondaru_enrol WDI 
secondary  school duration (years)  Secondary_dur WDI 
tertiary school enrolment (% gross)  Tertiary_enrol WDI 
tertiary school duration (years)  Tertiary_dur WDI 
land area (in square kilometres)  Land_area WDI 
population  
 
 Pop WDI 
imports and exports of good and services (BoP, 
current USD) 
 Imp, exp WDI 
labour participation rate (% of total)  Lfp WDI 
labour force  Laborf WDI 
unemployment, total (% of total labour force)  Unemp WDI 
fertility rate (births per woman)  Fertility WDI 
age dependency ratio (% of working age 
population) 
 Depratio_wa WDI 
urban population (% of total)  Urban_pop WDI 
Short-term debt (% of exports of goods and 
services) 
 Short_debt_gdp WDI 
terms of trade adjustment (constant LCU)  Terms_trade WDI 
real effective exchange rate index (2000=100)  Reer WDI 
 
